What we say and what we do: The relationship between real and hypothetical moral choices  by FeldmanHall, Oriel et al.
Cognition 123 (2012) 434–441Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Cognition
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate/COGNITWhat we say and what we do: The relationship between real
and hypothetical moral choices
Oriel FeldmanHall a,b,⇑, Dean Mobbs b, Davy Evans a,b, Lucy Hiscox b, Lauren Navrady b,
Tim Dalgleish b
aCambridge University, Cambridge CB2 1TP, UK
bMedical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge CB2 7EF, UKa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 23 August 2011
Revised 2 February 2012
Accepted 2 February 2012
Available online 9 March 2012
Keywords:
Morality
Real moral decision-making
Contextual information
Motivational factors0010-0277  2012 Elsevier B.V.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.02.001
⇑ Corresponding author at: Medical Research Co
Brain Sciences Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cambridge C
(0) 1223 355.
E-mail address: Oriel.FeldmanHall@mrc-cbu.cam.a
Open access under CCa b s t r a c t
Moral ideals are strongly ingrained within society and individuals alike, but actual moral
choices are profoundly inﬂuenced by tangible rewards and consequences. Across two stud-
ies we show that real moral decisions can dramatically contradict moral choices made in
hypothetical scenarios (Study 1). However, by systematically enhancing the contextual
information available to subjects when addressing a hypothetical moral problem—thereby
reducing the opportunity for mental simulation—we were able to incrementally bring sub-
jects’ responses in line with their moral behaviour in real situations (Study 2). These results
imply that previous work relying mainly on decontextualized hypothetical scenarios may
not accurately reﬂect moral decisions in everyday life. The ﬁndings also shed light on con-
textual factors that can alter how moral decisions are made, such as the salience of a per-
sonal gain.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Bertrand Russell captured the nature of humanmorality
when he stated ‘‘we have two kinds ofmorality side by side:
onewhichwe preach but do not practice and anotherwhich
we practice but seldompreach’’ (Russell, 2004). Despite this
capacity for moral hypocrisy, adhering to a human moral
code—a set of complex, evolved, and learned capacities
(Wright, 1994)—is integral to promoting pro-social interac-
tions. These interactions are guided by deeply ingrained
moral proscriptions, perhaps the most important of which
is not to harm others (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006;
Haidt, 2007). Aversion to harming others is a moral imper-
ative that not only transcends cultures (Brown, 1991), but
also species (Masserman, Wechkin, & Terris, 1964). It is so
strongly held that it can drive our hypothetical moraluncil Cognition and
B2 7EF, UK. Tel.: +44
c.uk (O. FeldmanHall).
 BY license.choices, even when a readiness to inﬂict harm would serve
the greater good (Foot, 1978). In fact, aversion to harm
appears to intensify as the prospect of hurting another
becomes increasingly ‘up close and personal’ (Greene, Som-
merville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001), with people
more likely to avoid inﬂicting harm if they have to carry
out the physical act themselves. This is illustrated most
starkly by people’s responses to moral scenarios like the
classic Trolley dilemmas. In these hypothetical moral prob-
lems, participants are willing to acquiesce to killing another
person in order to save the lives of ﬁve others if it requires
ﬂipping a switch to change the direction of the out-of-con-
trol trolley (Trolley Dilemma). However, in the Footbridge
Dilemma, there is an almost universal refusal to contem-
plate killing another by physically pushing them in front
of the trolley even if the act would save ﬁve others (Foot,
1978; Greene et al., 2001).
But do people practice what they preach when it comes
to averting harm in real life? While this moral proscription
to not harm others has been repeatedly shown to underpin
hypothetical moral decisions (Cushman et al., 2006;
1 An important aspect of these predictions is that we are referring to
situations where harm aversion is pitted against signiﬁcant personal gain.
For the majority of people, making any choice to harm another has a
personal cost, as it comes with an awareness that a moral code has been
violated (not to mention the potential social distress associated with being
caught making such a choice). We contend that for personal gain to drive
such a choice, it has to be substantial enough to offset potential moral pain
and social opprobrium (cf. Teper et al., 2011).
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Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007), it is unclear how much it
motivates real moral choices, especially when those
choices directly involve the option for self-beneﬁt. In fact,
daily life and human history are rife with examples of
people being harmed in exchange for personal gain or
higher ideals. So what can explain this apparent disconnect
between the data from decades of research on human
morality (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Kohlberg,
1973; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman,
2005) and anecdotal evidence amassed over hundreds of
years of historical record?
A key factor is that research on human morality has lar-
gely focused on hypothetical moral reasoning. Most com-
monly, subjects are presented with hypothetical moral
vignettes (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010;
Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010; Greene et al.,
2001; Greene et al., 2004; Kahane et al., 2011; Tassy
et al., 2011), stripped of all non-essential contextual infor-
mation, and then queried on their intention to perform an
action. These stylised scenarios act as a barometer for sub-
ject’s moral knowledge and the responses can be taken as a
rough indication of subjects’ readiness to perform the asso-
ciated moral behaviour (Ajzen, Brown, & Carvajal, 2004).
The reliance on these kinds of hypothetical moral
probes potentially presents limitations to understanding
moral cognition. First, philosophical dilemmas such as
the Trolley and Footbridge scenarios capture a particular
kind of moral tension, where the choice to harm another
is offset against the ‘greater good’ (i.e. saving ﬁve lives at
the cost of one). It is arguably rare in the real world to be
faced with the kinds of utilitarian decisions encapsulated
in these classic dilemmas (Knutson et al., 2010), where
the welfare of many is pitted against one’s reluctance to
commit a personal act of violence. We contend that most
moral choices that face us in daily life pit the fundamental
motivation of not harming others (physically or psycholog-
ically) against that of maximising self-gain (Haidt, 2007),
and that this distinct class of moral tension is especially
prevalent in everyday life. Accordingly, the motivational
force of self-beneﬁt is poorly understood, as research to
date has largely steered clear of using probes encapsulat-
ing this prototypical moral conﬂict.
Second, using hypothetical probes assumes that there is
a strong link between the moral intentions that they elicit
and action in the real world (Teper, Inzlicht, & Page-Gould,
2011). But the stories of lying, cheating, and stealing that
ﬁll newspapers and history books suggest little congruence
with the psychological data demonstrating people’s re-
ported aversion to harming others. So why might the link
between people’s stated moral intentions and their action
be weaker than often presumed? Moral cognition, like
any dynamic system, relies on complex cognitive processes
that integrate socio-emotional factors, such as situational
cues, past experience, and potential future rewards or con-
sequences (Bandura, 1989). Indeed, research on the psy-
chology of choice has illustrated that decisions are
inﬂuenced by reward and punishment contingencies
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), as well as the environment
in which they are made (Isen & Levin, 1972). To ascertain
if hypothetical moral probes act as a good proxy for realmoral behaviour, moral cognition needs to be studied in
action-relevant environments where the stakes are imme-
diate (Kang, Rangel, Camus, & Camerer, 2011), emotionally
charged (Teper et al., 2011), and tangible.
The central aims of the studies reported here were to
shift the focus of psychological inquiry by investigating
moral decision-making in situations where harm to an-
other and signiﬁcant personal gain act in direct opposition.
And then to examine how this moral tension was resolved
in both hypothetical and real contexts.
2. Study 1
Since the literature reports that aversion to harm is
such an inﬂuential force in hypothetical moral decisions
(Cushman et al., 2006), our ﬁrst assumption was that this
deeply seated moral imperative would dictate peoples’
predictions of human moral choices. To test this, in Study
1a we asked people whether they thought future partici-
pants would be more or less likely to avoid harming an-
other for signiﬁcant personal gain if the stakes were real
compared to hypothetical. Our prediction was that sub-
jects would postulate that in real moral scenarios people
would be more likely to abide by the harm principle than
those imagining doing the same scenario. Study 1b then
examined whether the views of the survey sample were
borne out: we directly compared real and hypothetical
decisions in two experimental conditions. Our prediction
was that when motivational forces are concrete and real
rather than presented in a hypothetical scenario, the incen-
tive for signiﬁcant self-beneﬁt would become more com-
pelling than the proscription not to harm others. In short,
while people in our survey (Study 1a) might predict that
the aversion to harming others would be more inﬂuential
in real moral situations compared to hypothetical ones,
an experimental test (Study 1b) would reveal the opposite
(Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson,
1997; Tetlock, 2003).1
To test our hypotheses, we used both real and hypothet-
ical versions of a ‘Pain versus Gain’ paradigm (PvG; Fig. 1a)
where we asked participants (Deciders) to make a moral
choice: beneﬁt oneself ﬁnancially or prevent physical harm
to another (the Receiver). Deciders chose howmuch, if any,
of a £20 endowment they would spend to prevent a series
of painful electric shocks from reaching the Receiver. The
more money Deciders paid on a given trial (up to £1 per
trial—20 trials), the lower the shock level inﬂicted. Paying
£1 removed the shock altogether; paying nothing ensured
the highest shock level. The outcome variable was how
much money Deciders kept across 20 trials (Money Kept),
with lower amounts indicating that preventing harm was
prioritized. Deciders watched the shocks being inﬂicted
via video feed (Fig. 1b). Importantly, Deciders were also
Fig. 1. (a) Experimental setup of the Real Pain versus Gain task. The Decider and Receiver (a confederate) met and interacted before the start of the
experiment, during which the Decider was also given a low-level sample shock. The video feedback was actually pre-recorded videos of real shocks being
administered. (b) Trial sequence for the Pain versus Gain task with highlighted decision event.
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randomly multiplied to a potential maximum pay-out of
£200. This was designed to make the potential personal
gains on offer signiﬁcant and motivationally compelling.
2.1. Study 1a: A survey predicting moral behaviour
2.1.1. Methods
2.1.1.1. Participants. We recruited 88 participants (mean
age 30.8, and SD ± 0.6; 35 females) for the survey. For this
study and for the others reported here, participants were
recruited from the volunteer panel at the Cognition and
Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge UK, and from the postgrad-
uate student community in Cambridge. Participants in the
studies were compensated for their time and travel and al-
lowed to keep any earnings accumulated during the task.
Participants gave informed consent, and the study was ap-
proved by the University of Cambridge, Dept. of Psychol-
ogy Research Ethics Committee.
2.1.1.2. Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to
complete a survey questionnaire regarding their predic-
tions of what other participants would do during both Real
and Hypothetical versions of the PvG task described above.
The PvG task was outlined and the survey participants
were explicitly asked whether other (future) subjects par-
ticipating in our studies would inﬂict more or less harm on
the PvG task when carrying it out for real as compared to
simply imagining carrying it out.
2.1.2. Results and discussion
As expected (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Wilson, Wheatley,
Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000), the signiﬁcant majority of
subjects surveyed (74%) thought that the proscription to
not harm others would exert a greater inﬂuence during
the real condition, resulting in people keeping less money
in the Real PvG compared to the Hypothetical PvG.2.2. Study 1b: An experimental test of moral behaviour
The next question was whether these predictions of hu-
man moral behaviour (identiﬁed in our survey; Study 1a)
were borne out in real moral action. To look at this, in Study
1b we asked one group of subjects to make a hypothetical
judgment about how much money they would imagine
keeping in the PvG task. We then compared their judg-
ments to the responses of those completing a Real version
of the PvG task. Our predictionwas that, counter to the con-
sensus view held by our survey sample, those participants
completing the Real PvG would prioritize personal gain
over another’s physical welfare to a greater extent than par-
ticipants engaging with the Hypothetical PvG.2.2.1. Methods
2.2.1.1. Participants. Forty-six participants completed
Study 1b; 20 (mean age 26.6, and SD ± 4.3; 9 females) com-
pleted the Real PvG task and 26 (mean age 25.5, and
SD ± 2.0; 18 females) completed the Hypothetical PvG sce-
nario. Four additional participants were excluded from
analyses due to expressing signiﬁcant doubts about the
veracity of the Real PvG task on a questionnaire adminis-
tered at the end of the experimental session (see below).2.2.1.2. Materials
2.2.1.2.1. The Real PvG task setup. In order to avoid priming
moral attitudes and to minimise explicit moral reasoning
during task performance, we recruited subjects under the
pretence of participating in a psychology study investigat-
ing economic decisions. We also went to great lengths to
ensure that our participants believed the paradigm, includ-
ing the use of detailed experimenter scripts and meticu-
lous and comprehensive experimental set up. Prior to the
task, each subject and our confederate (who took the role
of Receiver) completed paperwork where subjects pro-
vided consent both to receive and administer electric
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were told that they were recruited from two different pan-
els—one subject preselected to be the Decider (the true
subject administering the shocks) and the other to be the
Receiver (the confederate receiving the shocks). In order
to introduce a personal element to the task context and
to enhance the believability of the protocol, the Decider
and Receiver were together and allowed to interact. They
were then both taken to the testing laboratory that housed
the electric shock generator, a Digitimer DS7A, and briefed
on the set up of the experiment. The Decider, sitting in the
place where the Receiver would subsequently sit for the
duration of the experiment, received the low-level shock
choice and was asked to rate his/her own pain on a 10-
point scale (anchored from 1 = no pain to 10 = extreme
pain). This was to provide the Decider with explicit infor-
mation concerning what the Receiver would later experi-
ence during the Real PvG task. The Decider was then
taken to another room while the Receiver was purportedly
connected to the shock generator (see Fig. 1a). Once there,
the Decider was endowed with a real £20 note and told
that the money could be used to stop or attenuate the
shocks planned for the Receiver. Effectively, the more
money the subject paid, the lower the shock level the other
participant received on a given trial. Consequently to stop
all of the shocks across all 20 trials, Deciders would need to
spend all £20.
During the PvG task subjects believed they were view-
ing in real time actual shocks being administered to the Re-
ceiver, who was sitting in a nearby testing laboratory, via a
video feed. However, the videos were in fact pre-recorded
ﬁlms of actual shocks being administered to the confeder-
ate, pre-rated by an independent group so as to be
matched for shock level and corresponding pain intensity.
2.2.1.2.2. Stimuli
The Real PvG task comprised a series of 8 screens per
trial across 20 trials (see Fig. 1b). Each trial began with a
screen displaying the running amount of the subject’s bank
total (£20 on Trial 1) and current trial number. Subjects
then had to decide upon, and use a visual analogue scale
(VAS) to select the amount of money they wanted to spend
on that trial and thus the corresponding shock to be
administered to the Receiver. This phase was partitioned
into the ‘‘decide’’ and ‘‘select’’ periods. The Decide screen
was presented for a ﬁxed 3 s during which subjects were
asked to think about their decision. The select screen was
self-paced. After making a selection, subjects saw a 3 s dis-
play of their choice before experiencing a 4 s anticipation
phase during which subjects were told their choice was
being transmitted over the internal network to the adja-
cent testing lab where the Receiver was connected to the
shock generator. Following this anticipation period, sub-
jects viewed a 4 s video of the shock being administered
to the Receiver, or no shock if they had opted to spend
the full £1 permitted on a given trial. During this video
feed, subjects viewed the Receiver’s hand reacting to the
choice shock. Finally, subjects used a seven point VAS to
rate their distress levels on viewing the consequences of
their decision, before viewing a 4 s inter-trial-interval
(ITI). At the conclusion of the 20 trials, subjects were ableto press a button to randomly multiply any remaining
money between 1 and 10 times.
2.2.1.2.3. Shock administration
A Digitimer DS7A, which is a Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) approved device for both experimental and
clinical settings, was used to administer the shocks in the
Real PvG. Subjects received a mild, non-harmful sample
electric shock via an electrode dipped in saline solution
placed on the underside of their right wrist. While subjec-
tive pain level is different for everyone, a barely percepti-
ble, non-painful shock would approximately be 50 ls
with 2.5 mA at 400 V; subjects received a ‘low’ level sam-
ple shock at 2.5 mA with 200 ms at 400 V prior to their role
as Decider.
2.2.1.2.4. Post-experiment questionnaire
After the experimental session was ﬁnished for the Real
PvG condition, subjects answered a series of questions that
asked them to indicate on 8 point Likert scales: (1)
whether they felt they were being watched during the
experiment (anchored 1 = always watched, 8 = never
watched). This was in order to examine any putative ef-
fects of reputation management on responses; (2) how
much responsibility they (as Deciders) had for the electric
stimulations administered (anchored 1 = no responsibility,
8 = full responsibility). This was to verify that participants
did feel responsible for their choices, and also to explore
whether degree of reported responsibility was associated
with the behavioural outcomes; (3) and whether subjects
had any doubt as to the veracity of the paradigm (anchored
1 = completely believed, 8 = did not believe). This was to
allow us to exclude participants who indicated disbelief
in the protocol (those scoring above the mid-way point
on the scale; see below). We also checked if subjects were
aware of Milgram’s famous Obedience study (Milgram,
1963) as we wanted to able to explore whether such
knowledge had an inﬂuence on participants behaviour.
2.2.1.2.5. Hypothetical Scenario PvG task
Subjects in this condition completed a contextually
impoverished written version of the PvG probe (Scenario
PvG). The aim was to use the same format favoured by
the majority of the literature on moral reasoning (Greene
et al., 2001). Subjects were asked to imagine a scenario in
which they and another volunteer have both agreed to par-
ticipate in a psychology experiment. They are told that in
this scenario they have been given £20 at the beginning
of the experiment and informed that any money they have
left at the end can be multiplied up to 10 times with a pos-
sible pay out of £200. This is money they can keep. Partic-
ipants are then told that their task is to make decisions
regarding the number and intensity of painful but harm-
less electric shocks the other volunteer will receive. They
are informed that they can spend their £20 to reduce the
pain of the shocks or to stop the shocks from reaching
the other volunteer altogether. Having imagined this situ-
ation, participants are asked whether they will spend their
£20 to ensure no shocks reach the other volunteer, or
whether they will keep the money at the expense of the
other participants’ physical welfare.
Fig. 2. (a) Money retained across Study 1b shows that subjects, when responding to a written hypothetical version of the PvG task highly prioritise the
Receiver’s physical welfare as compared to those in the Real condition who maximise their own self-interest. (b) Money retained across Study 2 illustrates
that as more contextual information—like the speciﬁc nature of the reward and harm contingencies of the decision—became available to subjects,
hypothetical moral probes better predicted real moral decisions.
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Participants in the Real PvG and Scenario PvG groups
were matched for age (t(44) = 0.46, p = 0.65), however, the
groups were not matched for gender ratio: consequently
our key analysis was repeated with gender as a covariate.
In Study 1a, our survey sample strongly endorsed the
view that future participants in the PvG taskwould bemore
likely to preserve thewelfare of the Receiver (and thus keep
less money for themselves) in the real condition than in the
hypothetical condition. However, the results of Study 1b
(Fig. 2a) were in stark contrast to this. The data showed that
Deciders keptmost of their endowment in the Real PvG con-
dition (mean: £12.52/£20; SD ± 4.8) and more than seven
times asmuch as the participants completing the hypothet-
ical Scenario PvG task (mean: £1.53/£20; SD ± 5.43;
[t(44) = 7.12, p < 0.0001, Cohen’s d = 2.05]), where nearly
all of the endowmentwas relinquished to protect the Recei-
ver from harm. This difference remained signiﬁcant when
gender was included as a covariate (F(1,43) = 37.3,
p < 0.0001). In fact, only 7% of the subjects in the Scenario
PvG condition said they would keep any portion of the
money at the Receiver’s expense. In contrast, in the Real
PvG condition 100% of subjects kept a portion of their origi-
nal £20.
There was no support for Money Kept being signiﬁ-
cantly associated with degree of belief in the veracity of
the paradigm (r(18) = 0.28, p = 0.24; mean believability
score on a 8-point likert scale: 1.85, SD = ±0.93). However,
since the believability of the PvG paradigm is paramount in
interpreting the results, we also analysed the data from
subjects (n = 15) who rated the PvG paradigm as only a 1
or 2 on the 8-point believability scale. These subjects kept
a comparable amount of money as the full sample of 20
(mean = £11.75, SD = ±4.8), and signiﬁcantly more than
the hypothetical scenario group (t(39) = 6.01, p < 0.0001,
Cohen’s d = 2.04). There was still no signiﬁcant correlation
between beliefs and Money Kept for this group (r(13) = .23,
p = 0.41).
Importantly, there was no evidence that subjects mod-
iﬁed their moral decisions on the Real PvG task in responseto reputation management—as indexed by feelings of
being watched (Landsberger, 1958)—since the relevant
post study rating did not correlate signiﬁcantly with
Money Kept (r(13) = 0.32; p = 0.45: responses only ac-
quired for 15 of the 20 subjects). Additionally, for the Real
PvG, participants rated themselves more responsible than
either the Experimenter or the Receiver for the pain in-
ﬂicted on the Receiver. There were no signiﬁcant differ-
ences in correlations between Money Kept and degree of
responsibility (r(18) = 0.20, p = 0.41; mean responsibility
ratings on a 8-point likert scale: 6.35, SD ± 1.53). Further-
more, awareness of Milgram’s Obedience study did not
correlate signiﬁcantly with Money Kept (r(18) = 0.33,
p = 0.15). In fact, only six subjects reported being aware
of Milgram’s study and greater awareness was in the direc-
tion of being associated with keeping less money. One
might suppose that knowledge of the Milgram experiment
might reduce participants’ belief in the current study, how-
ever, the data illustrates the opposite association. Finally,
Deciders’ subjective pain ratings of the sample shock re-
vealed that they found the lowest shock uncomfortable,
and these ratings did not correlate signiﬁcantly with
Money Kept (r(18) = 0.22, p = 0.35; mean pain ratings
on a 10-point likert scale: 3.25, SD ± 1.97).
The ﬁndings from Study 1 illustrate that the proscrip-
tion to not harm others—predicted by our survey sample
to be a powerful force in real life moral decisions—in fact
has surprisingly little inﬂuence when potential signiﬁcant
personal gain is at stake. It seems that when a decision is
entirely hypothetical, the inﬂuence of breaking a moral
imperative (it is morally wrong to harm others, especially
for monetary gain) is more compelling than the inﬂuence
of imaginary monetary beneﬁt. In comparison, when this
substantial monetary self-beneﬁt becomes tangible and
real, it appears that the aversion to harming others is no
longer the most salient feature within the decision-making
space. Imaginary moral scenarios, stripped of contextual
and motivational cues like concrete incentives and conse-
quences, seem to maximise people’s opportunity to adhere
to moral duties, such as not harming others (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In contrast,
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inﬂuence of actual ‘money on the table’ is the overriding
inﬂuence. These data demonstrate that there can be funda-
mental differences between how we assume people will
act (as indexed by the survey data) and how they actually
act, and that introducing real outcome contingencies can
drastically change moral behaviour.
One potential limitation of the experimental framework
used in Study 1b is that subjects in the Real PvG condition
were recruited under the pretext of completing a psychol-
ogy economic task, while subjects in the hypothetical Sce-
nario PvG condition were told to imagine partaking in a
psychology experiment where they must make decisions
about shocks and money. However, the effect size of the
differences between conditions was sufﬁciently large that,
while this issue must be taken seriously, we feel that it
cannot fully account for the data.
Another issue that merits careful consideration is the
believability of the Real PvG paradigm. It is important that
participantswerenotkeepingmoremoney in the real condi-
tion simply because they did not believe that real shocks
were being administered to the Receiver, and therefore felt
that there was no disincentive to keep the money. There
are a number of reasons why we feel that this is unlikely to
be the case. First, we were careful to probe participants
about their belief in the paradigm. We felt conﬁdent that
theywould respond to thisquestionhonestlybecause if they
hadbehaved in a self-servingmanner due to the assumption
that the shocks were not real, we reasoned that they would
want to informusof this to avoidbeing judgedas ‘immoral’.2
Furthermore, we excluded from the analyses participants
whoexpressedanydisbelief in theprotocol. Indeed, in supple-
mentary analyses (see above)we focused only onparticipants
who scored very lowly on the belief scale, and found compa-
rable results to the analyseswith the initial sample. Addition-
ally, there was no support for a signiﬁcant association
between belief ratings and Money Kept.
Second, we would also reiterate that we went to great
lengths to enhance the believability of the task using care-
fully scripted experimental procedures, ensuring that the
participants met and interacted with the Receiver, and
viewed the room where the shocks would be delivered.
We also delivered a sample shock to each subject. Finally,
although pre-recorded, the video feedback participants
saw was footage of actual shocks being delivered.3
Third, we sought to address the concern that prior
knowledge of Milgram’s obedience studies, which used bo-
gus shock administration, might compromise the present2 In fact, subjects’ comments to us after the task, but before debrieﬁng,
indicate that subjects felt a genuine motivational conﬂict. For example, one
subjected stated: ‘‘I struggled with what to do. I wanted the money but I
didn’t want to hurt him. I decided that he could take a little pain and I could
make a little money. Somewhere in the middle. But I felt guilty’’. Another
said: ‘‘I was curious to see how ruthless I could be. I was happy to see that I
could control myself. I wanted the money. I tried the highest shock ﬁrst. I
wanted to see the reaction. And then took it from there.’’
3 In addition, the nature of feedback during debrieﬁng suggested that
subjects—after being told the true nature of the study—truly believed the
paradigm: ‘‘I am really upset that it is not real. If I had known it was real I
would have kept all the money’’ and ‘‘I can’t believe it is not real. I found the
shock painful. So I know that he must have been in real pain.’’study.We therefore took care to ask participants about their
knowledge of the Milgram study and to examine whether
this inﬂuenced the results. Knowledge of the Milgram
experiment (six subjects) did not appear to have been a fac-
tor in their responses. For example, one subject said: ‘‘Yea I
know about Milgram. And I thought about that when you were
describing the experiment, but I thought you couldn’t do that
anymore so I knew these shocks were real. Plus I felt it [the
shock] and I sawmyself being recorded when I was in the other
room.’’ In sum, we feel conﬁdent that for the participants in
our analysis sample from the Real PvG condition, disbelief
in the paradigm was not a signiﬁcant issue.
One possible account of the ﬁndings from Study 1 is that
simple hypothetical moral scenarios maximise the need for
participants tomentally simulate the pros and cons for a gi-
ven decision. In such situations, the impact of ingrained
moral proscriptions (even when there is knowledge that
the decision is hypothetical) is arguably far stronger than
the impact of imaginary money. In contrast, in the real sit-
uation, the need for mental simulation is minimised, allow-
ing the actual motive power of real money and real harm to
yield their inﬂuence such that if the money is sufﬁcient, the
harm will be administered. This analysis is consistent with
Loewenstein’s work on the hot–cold empathy gap (Van Bo-
ven & Loewenstein, 2005) andwith Damasio’s somaticmar-
ker hypothesis (Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006), both of
which emphasise the differential inﬂuence of emotion-
arousing features of a decision space in real decisions com-
pared to hypothetical ones.
It follows from these arguments that reducing the need
for mental simulation on the PvG task, even in situations
where the money and harm remain hypothetical, should
shift participants’ behaviour away from that exhibited in
the simple scenario condition of Study 1b and closer to that
exhibited in the Real PvG task (Wilson et al., 2000).3. STUDY 2: Enriching the context
Based on this reasoning, in Study 2 we created three
additional hypothetical PvG tasks, with stepped increases
in the richness of their situational and contextual cues: a
longer written version of the hypothetical task used in
Study 1b (Enriched Scenario PvG), a computer-adminis-
tered version where participants actually worked through
the 20 trials knowing that the task was hypothetical but
did not meet the Receiver or experience a sample shock
(Trial-by-Trial PvG), and a ‘near-real’ version that was iden-
tical to the Real PvG in every respect except that the money
and shocks were completely imaginary (Near-Real PvG).
Our hypothesis was that there would be a signiﬁcant in-
crease in Money Kept across the 4 versions of the hypothet-
ical PvG (the simple scenario from Study 1b and the three
new versions) as the versions reduced the scope and need
for mental simulation when making a moral decision.3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
In Study 2, 93 subjects completed the three new hypo-
thetical versions of the PvG task: 15 subjects (mean age
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PvG, 18 subjects (mean age 23.8, and SD ± 1.0; 12 females)
completed the Trial-by-Trial PvG, and 63 subjects (mean
age 29.0, and SD ± 2.2; 41 females) completed the Enriched
Scenario PvG.
3.1.2. Hypothetical PvG conditions
3.1.2.1. The Near-Real PvG. This condition required subjects
to complete the same task as in the Real PvG (see Study
1b). Deciders still met the Receiver and experienced the
same low-level shock. The only differences were that
Deciders were not endowed with money and were told
to simply imagine making the relevant decision. Thus, in
this condition there was no video feedback but instead a
blue screen was presented for 4 s each trial.
3.1.2.2. Trial-by-Trial PVG. This version was the same as the
Near Real PvG except that subjects did not have the expe-
rience of meeting the Receiver or receiving a sample shock.
Again, subjects were asked to imagine that £20 was at
stake and that another participant was receiving the cho-
sen shocks. A blue screen was also presented for 4 s during
the video feedback portion of each trial.
3.1.2.3. Enriched Scenario PvG. Subjects were presented
with a contextually rich written version of the PvG dilem-
ma in which more information was provided than in the
simple scenario in Study 1a.
3.2. Results and discussion
The data from the three new hypothetical scenarios
are combined with the data from the simple scenario in
Study 1b. The groups of participants across the four
conditions were matched on age and gender ratio
(age: F(3,118) = 0.92, p = 0.43; gender: Chi-square = 2.9,
p = 0.39).
The data from the four hypothetical PvG conditions are
shown in Fig 2b. ANOVA revealed a clear and signiﬁcant
effect of context, such that systematically enriching the sit-
uational context, and thus increasing the ecological validity
of the dilemma, reduced the gap between hypothetical
moral choices and real moral action [(see Fig 2a),
F(3,118) = 16.24, p < 0.0001, partial g2 = 0.29; with each
condition signiﬁcantly differing from its neighbour: post
hoc LSD tests Ps < 0.05]. A comparison between the Near-
Real PvG condition in Study 2 and the Real PvG in Study
1b revealed no signiﬁcant difference between them
[t(33) = 0.11, p = 0.91]. This supports our contention that
the more a hypothetical PvG task contextually resembles
the Real PvG, the more people are willing to augment their
personal gain at the expense of harming another.
4. General discussion
Classical research on morality has shown that the pro-
scription not to harm others is a deeply ingrained moral
principal (Greene et al., 2001). This was reﬂected in partic-
ipants’ predictions about moral decisions to inﬂict harm in
exchange for signiﬁcant monetary gain: Study 1a showedoverwhelmingly that participants believed people would
be much less likely to inﬂict harm for money when the
consequences were real than when they were simply
hypothetical. However, a test examining these predictions
(Study 1b) revealed the opposite result: in contrast to the
survey predictions, participants were signiﬁcantly more
likely to inﬂict harm for monetary gain under real condi-
tions than they were under hypothetical conditions. We
reasoned that the inﬂuence of harm aversion diminishes
as the impact of other motivational forces—such as signif-
icant ﬁnancial gain—become more salient. These ﬁndings
imply that not only are subjects unable to accurately judge
outcomes of moral behaviour, but under certain conditions
they also make starkly different moral choices in real, com-
pared to hypothetical, contexts.
To explain why real moral choices radically contradict
the responses generated by the type of decontextualized
hypothetical moral scenarios used in Study 1b, we ex-
plored whether enriching the contextual information
available to subjects would inﬂuence their decisions (Study
2). We found that the more spartan the contextual infor-
mation, and hence the more room people have for mental
simulation when addressing a hypothetical moral problem,
the more subjects’ responses diverged from real behaviour.
This strongly suggests that the underspeciﬁed and impov-
erished nature of hypothetical moral probes is unable to
capture the complex social, emotional and motivational
pressures inherent to real moral decisions. This is consis-
tent with work in other psychological domains (Gilbert &
Wilson, 2007; Wilson et al., 2000), showing that simulating
future choices can be markedly inconsistent with reality.
Accordingly, we found that enhancing the speciﬁcity
and ecological validity of situational cues in hypothetical
moral probes—thereby encapsulating the complex motiva-
tional forces at work in real decisions—can bring hypothet-
ical choices in-line with real moral behaviour. Therefore,
we suggest that during simple hypothetical moral deci-
sions, subjects are unable to access the contextual-depen-
dent knowledge experienced during real moral choices,
and instead rely on their most salient motivation: to up-
hold the moral duty to avoid harming another.
Taken together, these ﬁndings have a number of impor-
tant implications. First, and most strikingly, peoples’ real
moral choices drastically contradict the responses gener-
ated by simple hypothetical moral probes. Second, these
data suggest that our moral beliefs may have a much
weaker impact on our decision-making if the context is en-
riched with other compelling motivational forces, such as
the presence of a signiﬁcant self-gain. This raises questions
about whether hypothetical moral decisions generated in
response to decontextualized scenarios, act as a good
proxy for real moral choices. Even though moral ideals
are strongly ingrained within society, actual moral choices
seem exceptionally labile and profoundly inﬂuenced by the
tangibility of rewards, situational cues and concrete
consequences.
While the aim of the studies reported here was to
examine considerations of harm against self-beneﬁt under
both real and hypothetical conditions, many questions
arise from this data: what are the cognitive mechanisms
driving self-serving behaviour? How do individual differ-
O. FeldmanHall et al. / Cognition 123 (2012) 434–441 441ences contribute to the moral decision-making process?
What other motivations besides harm aversion inﬂuence
our sensitivity to self-beneﬁt? Future studies designed to
disentangle the various cognitive mechanisms driving
moral motivations is an important next step in further elu-
cidating the nature of moral behaviour.
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